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Denial of Hospital Admitting Privileges for Non-
Physician Providers-A Per Se Antitrust Violation?
Rapidly rising health care costs have focused the nation's atten-
tion on the health care industry.' Experts suggest that increased
competition may reduce some of these costs. 2 A parallel develop-
ment in health care has been the increased number of non-physi-
cian providers such as podiatrists, nurse practitioners, nurse
midwives, and chiropractors. In general, these providers specialize
in a limited area of health care and offer services related to, but
distinct from, medical care.3 State law regulates their licensing and
clinical practice. 4
Within their practices, these non-physician providers may need
to utilize hospital facilities and diagnostic equipment.5 When these
hospital services are unavailable because the hospital refuses to
grant admitting privileges, the provider loses a competitive advan-
tage.6 Accordingly, denial of admitting privileges to non-physicians
constitutes a barrier to competition in the health care industry.
This note examines the application of federal antitrust law,
specifically section 1 of the Sherman Act,7 to hospitals' denial of
admitting privileges to non-physicians. Part I discusses the pur-
pose, scope, and judicial interpretation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Part II defines group boycotts and describes their treatment
under section 1. Part III explains how denial of admitting privi-
leges to non-physicians can constitute an unlawful group boycott.
1 Health care costs account for over 10% of the gross national product. In 1983, U.S.
expenditures for health care totaled approximately $355 billion, $1,459 per person. This
represents an increase of 10.3% over 1982 levels. Forty-one percent of the 1983 health
care expenditures stemmed from hospital care, and 19% from payment for physicians' serv-
ices. See Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health Expenditures, 1983, 6 HEALTH CARE
FINANCING REV., Winter 1984, at 1.
2 See generally Baron, Licensure of Health Care Professionals: The Consumer's Casefor Abolition,
9 Am. J.L. & MED. 335, 348-55 (1983); Enthoven, Health Care Cost Control Through Incentives
and Competition, in COST SHARING IN HEALTH CARE 29, 41-42 (1980); Symposium: Market-Ori-
ented Approaches to Achieving Health Policy Goals, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981).
3 See Dolan & Ralson, Hospital Admitting Privileges and the Sherman Act, 18 Hous. L. REV.
707, 728-29 (1981).
4 Id. at 731.
5 Id. at 713. See also Jost, The Joint Commission on Accreditations of Hospitals: Private Regula-
tion of Health Care and the Public Interest, 24 B.C.L. REV. 835, 873 (1983).
6 See Dolan,& Ralson, supra note 3, at 711-14; Havighurst & King, Private Credentialingof
Health Care Personnel: An Antitrust Perspective (Part One), 9 AM.J.L. & MED. 131, 145 (1983);
Note, Hospital Staff Privileges and the Group Boycott Rule, 25 B.C.L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1984).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, com-
bination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal."
It also examines the rationale behind both a "per se" and "rule of
reason" analysis of this conduct, and explains that a per se analysis
should apply.
I. Sherman Act, Section 1
In broad language, the Sherman Act prohibits agreements
which unduly restrain interstate trade or commerce." Courts use
one of two analytical approaches in determining whether the chal-
lenged conduct violates the Sherman Act. These approaches are
the per se rule and the rule of reason.
Under the per se approach, courts presume, based upon judi-
cial experience with certain types of conduct, that the conduct un-
duly restrains competition and can be condemned without
analyzing the purpose or effect of the restraint.9 The Supreme
Court has classified group boycotts as per se illegal.' 0
When the challenged conduct does not "fit" within a per se
category, courts apply the rule of reason and examine the purpose
and probable effects of the conduct to determine if, on balance, it is
8 The statute literally provides a blanket prohibition of every agreement which restrains
trade. However, Supreme Court decisions have modified the statute's all-inclusive nature
by limiting its application to situations involving "undue restraints" on competition. See,
e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (Sherman Act prohibits mo-
nopolies and combinations which unduly restrict trade or commerce); Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609 (1914) (Sherman Act prohibits
combinations which restrict the "free and natural flow" of interstate commerce); United
States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911) (section 1 prohibits undue
restraints on commerce); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-60 (1911) (sec-
tion I prohibits activities which unduly restrict competition).
9 In Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court explained the
rationale for the per se rule:
There are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use. This principle of per se un-
reasonableness . . . avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and pro-
longed economic investigation into the entire history of the industry involved...
in an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable.
Id. at 5.
The per se rule does not apply until the judiciary has had sufficient experience with the
type of restraint involved to conclusively presume that it causes or will likely cause signifi-
cant anticompetitive effects. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S.
332, 344 (1982); United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).,
10 See note 17 infra and accompanying text. Other conduct which the Supreme Court
has classified as per se illegal under the Sherman Act includes price-fixing (see, e.g., Arizona
v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150 (1940)), horizontal market divisions (see, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S.
596 (1972)), and tying arrangements (see, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958). But see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (indicat-
ing that the Court may not apply the per se rule as readily to tying arrangements)).
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pro- or anticompetitive." The rule of reason approach involves a
more extensive economic analysis than the per se rule. 12
For the plaintiff, the advantage of a strict per se analysis is that
he does not have to prove the actual effect of the challenged con-
duct. 13 Furthermore, once the court determines that the conduct
falls within the per se rule, the court will not consider the defend-
ant's justifications for the restraint. 14 The major obstacle which the
plaintiff faces is convincing the court that the challenged activity is
within the per se category. 15
II. Group Boycott Doctrine
Although the Supreme Court has consistently condemned
group boycotts 16 as per se illegal under the Sherman Act,17 it is not
11 Rule of reason analysis requires the examination of several factors to determine the
effect of the restraint on competition. These factors include the nature of the industry
involved before and after the restraint was imposed, and the type of restraint imposed. In
examining the nature of the restraint, courts study both its purpose and actual or probable
effect. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). See also L.
SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 68, at 187-88 (1977).
12 Although the per se rule requires less extensive analysis of the purpose and effect of
the challenged conduct, the focus of both the per se rule and the rule of reason remains the
same-the effect of the restraint on competition. In practice, the distinction between the
two types often becomes blurred. Even under the per se rule, courts may require an exten-
sive examination of the market and circumstances surrounding the challenged activity. See
National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 n.26 (1984).
13 See Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1367 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (under a
per se rule, plaintiff is not required to establish the actual harm from the challenged con-
duct); Kissan, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, Antitrust and Hospital Privileges: Testing the Con-
ventional Wisdom, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 595, 604 (1982) (per se rules reduce plaintiffs burden of
proof because no showing of specific anticompetitive effects is required).
14 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (group boy-
cotts are per se illegal and notjustified by reasonableness of restraint); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941) (reasonableness of defendants' conduct is not rele-
vant where activity is found to be a per se illegal group boycott).
15 Professor Sullivan notes that two requirements must be met before the per se rule
applies: (1) the activity must be likely to cause substantial injury to competition; and (2)
analysis of the effect of the activity on competition must be costly (both in terms of dollars
and time), complex, and uncertain. Where these requirements are met, the courts should
condemn the activity based upon judicial economy. L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, § 70, at
193.
16 Group boycott or concerted refusal to deal, as used in this note, refers to joint activi-
ties by competitors either to keep other competitors from entering the field or to drive
existing competitors out of the field. Professor Sullivan distinguishes these activities from
concerted actions intended to reach some goal other than driving the competitor out of the
market. Conduct within the latter group should not be analyzed under the per se rule. See
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, § 83, at 232. Professor Bauer defines group boycotts as agree-
ments between two or more parties that one or more of the parties either will not deal at all
or will deal only on disadvantageous terms with another party. Bauer, Per Se Illegality of
Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 685 n.5
(1979); cfSt. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 544-45 (1978). The com-
mon theme of these definitions is that joint actions by competitors for the purpose of re-
straining another competitor and thereby improving their own competitive advantage
should be condemned as per se illegal.
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clear what parameters the Court uses to determine that certain ac-
tivities constitute a group boycott."' An examination of the cases
involving concerted activities classified by the Court as per se ille-
gal, however, does yield certain common characteristics.
One characteristic of a group boycott is an agreement, between
two or more parties, not to deal with a third party. This agreement
may be express or inferred from the parties' conduct. 19
17 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New
York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207
(1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
18 The uncertainty surrounding the group boycott per se illegality rule has led to much
criticism from commentators. See, e.g., Bauer, supra note 16, at 685; McCormick, Group Boy-
cotts-Per Se or Not Per Se, That Is the Question, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 703 (1976); Woolley, Is a
Boycott a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust Laws?, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 773 (1974).
The question of the continued vitality of traditional per se analysis as applied to group
boycotts was recently argued before the Supreme Court in Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.
v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S.
Ct. 77 (1984). Northwest Wholesale is a buying cooperative composed of retail sellers of
office supplies. Co-op members can purchase supplies at a discount because of the associa-
tion's ability to buy in large volumes. In addition, members receive a yearly rebate on
purchases. Pacific Stationery, a member of the co-op for over 20 years, was expelled from
the association without notice. 715 F.2d at 1394-95.
Pacific brought suit against Northwest alleging that the expulsion constituted a per se
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. The district court granted Northwest's motion for
summary judgment. The court was unwilling to apply the per se rule on these facts and
held that the claim failed under the rule of reason because Pacific failed to show sufficient
anticompetitive effect in the relevant market. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the facts of the case supported application of the per se rule because
the defendant had acted primarily out of anticompetitive animus. Id. at 1395-96.
In the United States Supreme Court, Northwest argued, inter alia, that any analysis of
alleged group boycott activity must include an analysis of the defendant's market power and
the effect of the challenged conduct. The courts should take a "quick look" at the market
impact of the challenged activity before characterizing it as per se illegal. Brief of Petitioner
at 14-15, 32-33, Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.,
715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 77 (1984).
Pacific, although arguing that traditional per se analysis should apply in this case, rec-
ognized that the Court might articulate some modification of the traditional rule. Notwith-
standing any modification, per se illegality should still apply where the defendant acted with
the primary intent to injure the competitive advantage of another competitor and the con-
duct lacks any economic justification. Brief of Respondent at 22-28, Pacific Stationery &
Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, 105 S. Ct. 77 (1984). This approach echoes the "quick look" urged by petitioner.
Should the Court adopt the "quick look" approach in group boycott cases, the plaintiff
will lose many of the advantages of traditional per se analysis. See notes 13-14 supra and
accompanying text. Specifically, the plaintiff would be required to support his claim by
some type of market analysis of the effect of the challenged conduct. Proof of the existence
of an agreement not to deal with the plaintiff-competitor, standing alone, would not suffice.
19 In an early case, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U.S. 600 (1914), the Supreme Court held that the circulation among members of a retail
lumber association of "blacklists", which identified wholesalers who sold directly to the
public, constituted a violation of the Sherman Act. Without using "per se" language, the
Court condemned this activity because it caused retailers to refuse to deal with the named
wholesalers. Eastern States did not involve an explicit agreement among retailers not to deal
with the named wholesalers. Nevertheless, the Court inferred a conspiracy based on the
"natural tendency" for retailers to stop dealing with the wholesalers after the retailers had
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Per se illegal group boycotts also involve an intent to destroy
or seriously hinder another's competitive position. 20 Logical infer-
ences based upon circumstantial evidence can support a finding of
anticompetitive animus. For example, in Associated Press v. United
States,21 the Court held unlawful the Association's bylaws which re-
stricted news service to members only, and gave current members
veto power over the membership applications of nonmember com-
petitors. 22 The Court found that, although no such purpose was
expressed, the bylaws functioned to hinder or destroy
competition. 23
The effect of the challenged conduct also influences characteri-
zation of the activity. When concerted action potentially limits the
received the blacklists. Id. at 608-09. See also Theatre Enters. Inc. v. Paramount Film Dis-
trib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954) (courts may infer an agreement from circumstantial
evidence of the parties' business behavior); cf. Schoenkopf v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 637 F.2d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 1980); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F.
Supp. 121, 128 (E.D. Ky. 1982).
20 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966) ("classic conspir-
acy" in restraint of trade involves collective action to eliminate competitors by refusing to
deal with them); KIor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 210-13 (1959) (allega-
tions that appliance manufacturers, distributors and retailer agreed that the manufacturers
and distributors would not deal with plaintiff-retailer, or would deal only on unfavorable
terms, show more than a "private quarrel" between retailers; allegations clearly show a
group boycott which limits the plaintiffs ability to compete in the market); Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1945) (Sherman Act prohibits collective action intended
to destroy competition); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1941)
(group boycott is per se illegal where parties intend to destroy business of a competitor).
21 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
22 The bylaws prescribed a simple admission procedure for applicants who did not
compete with current members. In contrast, a competitor-applicant faced a much tougher
procedure. If any member objected to the competitor's application, the board of directors
referred the application to a full meeting of the Association. Before the competitor could
attain membership, he was required to pay substantial fees (in some cases the fees exceeded
$1,000,000). In addition, the potential member must either give up any exclusive rights he
held to news or news picture services or arrange for the competitor-member to receive the
same services on equivalent terms. Finally, a majority of the members had to approve the
application. Id. at 10-11.
23 Id. at 16. See also Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963). In Silver, an
over-the-counter market securities dealer, who was not a member of the New York Stock
Exchange ("Exchange"), obtained "temporary approval" from the Exchange for private
wire connections with Exchange members. The Exchange discontinued these connections
without notice or explanation. The issue before the Court involved whether the Securities
Act of 1934 impliedly exempted the Exchange from antitrust immunity. The Court stated
that in the absence of the Securities Act, the Exchange's withdrawal of wire connections
without notice or explanation would constitute a per se illegal group boycott. Id. at 347.
In characterizing the Exchange's actions as a group boycott, the Court emphasized that
Silver had lost a service which, by its nature, was vital to maintaining a competitive position
within the industry. Id. at 348 n.5. The plaintiff relied heavily on instant communication
with Exchange members. The Exchange's action deprived him of an essential service and
caused a significant decrease in the plaintiffis volume of business. Id. at 345. Although the
Court did not specifically discuss purpose, the Court's language suggests that without statu-
tory justification (i.e., the Securities Act of 1934), the only logical purpose of such actions
would have been to drive a competitor out of the field. See id. at 348.
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freedom of remaining competitors to deal in the market 24 or pre-
vents competitors from obtaining access to the market,25 the activ-
ity more closely resembles a per se illegal group boycott. Although
per se analysis does not require proof of specific effects, the plaintiff
probably must show some potential for anticompetitive results
before the court will classify the activity as within the per se rule.
A final element relevant to characterization as a per se illegal
group boycott is some showing of the defendant's market power,
although proof of monopoly power is not required.2 6 Where the
challenged conduct has a "tendency to monopolize," the activity is
more properly classified as within the per se category.2 7
The Supreme Court has never clearly stated the proper analy-
sis for determining when the per se rule should apply to concerted
activity. Recent cases suggest that the Court uses a "continuum"
approach with no clear demarcation between per se analysis and
rule of reason analysis. 28 Therefore, if the plaintiff can make a
strong showing of an anticompetitive purpose and effect, plus mar-
ket power, a court should be more willing to apply the per se rule.
III. Denial of Admitting Privileges-An Antitrust Violation
The extent to which non-physician providers can be truly com-
petitive with physicians depends, in part, on their access to hospital
facilities. 29 Access to these facilities requires admitting privileges.
24 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966) (per se illegal
group boycott found where concerted action limited the freedom of non-boycotted retailers
to deal with discount merchants); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465
(1941) (explicit agreement to boycott certain retailers held within the per se rule because it
reduced retailers' sales outlets and supply sources and restricted retailers' freedom of
action).
25 See, e.g., General Motors, 384 U.S. at 146 (conspiracy to exclude traders from the mar-
ket is per se illegal); Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 13-14 (trade restraints which limit access to
the market for potential competitors violate Sherman Act policies). See also Radiant Burn-
ers, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 659-60 (1961) (allegation that
defendants conspired to block plaintiff's access to market is sufficient to state a cause of
action under § 1).
26 See, e.g., Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 13 (restrictive bylaws of the largest news agency
in the United States held facially invalid as a violation of the Sherman Act; fact that the
Association held less than monopoly power deemed irrelevant); Fashion Originators' Guild,
312 U.S. at 462, 467 (where association controlled up to 60% of the market, agreement
among association's members to boycott certain retailers held per se illegal as a group
boycott).
27 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores 359 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild, 312 U.S. at 466.
28 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962
n.26 (1984);Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556-58 (1984).
See also Bauer, supra note 16, at 704; Liebenluft & Pollard, Antitrust Scrutiny of the Health
Professions: Developing a Framework for Assessing Private Restraints, 34 VA.n. L. REv. 927, 946
(1981).
29 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 713-14 (lack of admitting privileges can result in
loss of patients and therefore loss of revenue; lack of privileges may also result in general
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Normally the medical staff (composed of physicians) controls the
system whereby privileges are either granted or denied even if, on
paper, the final decision emanates from the hospital's board of di-
rectors. 30 The potential for group boycott activity is inherent in
this system. 31
To successfully litigate an antitrust challenge to a hospital's de-
nial of staff privileges, a non-physician provider must establish
three elements under section 1 of the Sherman Act: (1) contract,
combination, or conspiracy; (2) effect on interstate commerce; and
(3) restraint of trade.32  This note will treat each element
separately.
A. Contract, Combination, or Conspiracy
The first element of a section 1 violation is plurality of action.33
In terms of hospital admitting privileges, the board of directors'
decision to grant or deny privileges stems from the recommenda-
tions of the medical staff. This action does not constitute a conspir-
acy between the hospital and medical staff, however, because
employees cannot conspire with their employer, within the mean-
ing of a section 1 conspiracy. 34
Nevertheless, the requisite concerted action has been found
among hospital staff members as independent practitioners. In
Weiss v. York Hospital,35 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held, as a matter of law, that a medical staff, as a com-
bination of individual physicians, may conspire within itself even
though the hospital cannot legally conspire with its own medical
staff.36 In reaching this conclusion, the Weiss court characterized
the medical staff as independent economic entities in competition
with other physicians in the community and on the medical staff.
As such, their actions satisfied the contract, combination, or con-
spiracy requirement. 37 Accordingly, the court of appeals found an-
perception that practitioner without privileges is "second class"); Note, supra note 6, at 388
(practitioner without hospital privileges is less attractive to patients who may assume in-
competence, or desire a practitioner who can provide both in-patient and out-patient serv-
ices; lack of hospital privileges eliminates a potential source of referrals within the hospital).
30 Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 709-12.
31 See note 16 supra.
32 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
33 L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, § 108.
34 See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731, 2741 (1984).
35 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984) (osteopath challenged denial of hospital admitting privi-
leges under § 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging that medical staff engaged in an unlawful
group boycott), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
36 Id. at 814.
37 Id. at 816. Other courts have not interpreted the conspiracy requirement as liberally
in the context of antitrust challenges to denial of admitting privileges. See Feldman v.Jack-
son Memorial Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000, 1007-09 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (complaint alleging un-
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titrust scrutiny appropriate "to insure that [the staff] members do
not abuse otherwise legitimate organizations to secure an unfair ad-
vantage over their competitors."38
The Weiss court approached the conspiracy issue pragmatically.
Medical staff physicians frequently maintain independent private
practices. 39 As independent practitioners they compete directly
with non-physician providers for certain types of patients. 40 Medi-
cal staff decisions to deny admitting privileges to non-physician
competitors enhances the competitive position of the individual
staff members. Because Congress designed the Sherman Act to
prevent this type of anticompetitive behavior,4 1 courts should look
beyond the "medical staff" label and examine the physicians' in-
dependent economic interests to determine if the necessary con-
certed action exists. Only if all medical staff members have no
independent interests, for example when the physicians are salaried
hospital employees without private practices, should the courts
consider the medical staff as hospital employees and therefore inca-
pable of conspiring within the meaning of section 1. Otherwise,
lawful conspiracy fails where plaintiff does not establish either that other staff members
were his competitors or evidence of an agreement among staff members); Pontius v. Chil-
dren's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1375-76 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (complaint alleging group boy-
cott fails because alleged conspirators did not directly compete with plaintiff). But see
McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 128 (E.D. Ky. 1982), remanded on
other grounds, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,054 (conspiracy to boycott plaintiff inferred
from conduct of individual staff members); Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F.
Supp. 1185, 1190 (M.D. Tenn. 1982) (corporation controlled by medical doctors with a
board of directors dominated by medical doctors may be capable of concerted action); Wil-
liams v. Kleaveland, 534 F. Supp. 912, 920 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (conspiracy requirement
satisfied if plaintiff can show that staff members acted for personal benefit).
38 Weiss, 745 F.2d at 816. The Weiss court relied on Supreme Court dicta in Associated
Press and Silver in concluding that medical staff members may legally conspire among them-
selves to deny admitting privileges. Id. at 815 n.49. In neither case did the Supreme Court
specifically discuss whether members of an association may be considered as independent
entities for antitrust purposes. In Associated Press, however, the Court condemned the asso-
ciation's bylaws, which gave members veto power over the application of nonmember com-
petitors, as per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act. In Silver, the Court found that, but
for the legislative mandate of self-regulation, the action of New York Stock Exchange mem-
bers, in discontinuing wire services to nonmembers without notice, constituted a violation
of § 1. Since conspiracy is a requisite element of a § 1 violation, a reasonable inference
from these cases is that members of an association may be considered as independent enti-
ties capable of entering into an illegal conspiracy.
39 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 711; Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra
note 13, at 639-40.
40 Physicians compete directly with non-physicians according to specialty area. For ex-
ample, obstetricians compete with nurse midwives for patients who can reasonably be ex-
pected to have uncomplicated pregnancies and deliveries. Orthopedic surgeons compete
with podiatrists for patients with medical problems involving the feet.
41 In Associated Press, the Supreme Court stated: "The Sherman Act was specifically in-
tended to prohibit independent businesses from becoming 'associates' in a common plan
which is bound to reduce their competitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which
the groups compete." 326 U.S. at 15.
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courts should view staff members as independent entities capable
of joint action.
Under this standard, a plaintiff would meet his burden of proof
on the conspiracy issue by showing: (1) that at least some staff
members maintained private practices; and (2) that the decision to
deny admitting privileges emanated from the medical staff.42 The
existence of independent practices establishes the ability of medical
staff members to conspire with one another. This conspiracy is ef-
fectuated when the board of directors acts upon an adverse deci-
sion from the medical staff.43
B. Effect on Interstate Commerce
Next, the plaintiff must prove an effect on interstate com-
merce. 44 Denial of admitting privileges implicates interstate com-
merce in one of three ways: (1) by affecting the plaintiffs activity in
interstate commerce;45 (2) by affecting the defendant's general
business activity;46 or (3) by affecting the defendant's specific activi-
42 One commentator and some lower courts suggest that a finding of conspiracy re-
quires proof that staff members compete directly with the applicant. See Drexel, The Anti-
trust Implications of the Denial of Hospital Staff Privileges, 36 U. MIAMi L. REv. 207, 223-24
(1982). See also note 37 supra. The existence of a conspiracy should not depend upon
whether staff members compete directly with non-physicians. The court should consider
the question of direct competition only in relation to restraint of trade issues, such as the
probable effect of the challenged conduct on the availability of services.
In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 104 S. Ct. 2731 (1984), the
Supreme Court defined conspiracy as joint action between two or more entities to achieve a
common benefit, where the entities previously acted independently in their own interests.
Id. at 2741. As private practitioners, physicians act independently in their own economic
interests. As medical staff members, physicians have the opportunity to use their joint
power to further their interests by denying admitting privileges to non-physicians. For ex-
ample, even though an obstetricians do not compete directly with podiatrists, by denying
privileges to this class of non-physicians, obstetricians can indirectly enhance their own
interests in excluding other non-physicians, such as nurse midwives. Therefore, by denying
privileges to all non-physicians, staff members can protect their general economic interests
as physicians.
43 In the typical hospital organizational plan, the final decision regarding admitting
privileges emanates from the board of directors, based upon recommendations from the
medical staff. Looking behind the formal structure, the power to grant or deny privileges
rests with the medical staff. See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 709-12; Kissam, Webber,
Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 13, at 607-08.
44 A plaintiff may meet the interstate commerce requirement by showing either that the
defendant's activity is within interstate commerce or substantially affects interstate com-
merce. See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980). The provision of hospital serv-
ices and health care is essentially a local activity. Therefore, a plaintiff challenging the
denial of admitting privileges will usually rely on the "affecting commerce" test to meet the
jurisdictional requirement. See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 13, at 628-
29; Note, supra note 6, at 395.
45 See, e.g., Maresse v. Interqual, 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984); Cardio-Medical Assocs.
v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1983); Hahn v. Oregon Physicians
Servs., 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115 (1983); Nara v. American
Dental Ass'n, 526 F. Supp. 452 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
46 See, e.g., Feldman v. Jackson Memorial Hosp., 571 F. Supp. 1000 (S.D. Fla. 1983);
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ties related to the denial of privileges. 47 Lower courts which focus
on the defendant's activities are split regarding the correct inter-
pretation of the interstate commerce requirement. 48 Some courts
require only that the defendant's general business activity affect in-
terstate commerce, while others require a more particularized
showing that the challenged conduct itself affects interstate
commerce.
The plaintiffs burden of proof changes significantly according
to the standard adopted by the court. If the court focuses solely on
the challenged conduct's effect on the plaintiff's activity in inter-
state commerce, the non-physician provider will often be unable to
meet the jurisdictional requirement. Physicians can satisfy this
standard by showing that potential patients receive Medicare or
Medicaid benefits,49 that they travel across state lines to obtain
Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 562 F. Supp. 1259 (W.D. Pa. 1983); Williams v. Kleaveland, 534 F.
Supp. 912 (W.D. Mich. 1981); McDonald v. Saint Joseph's Hosp., 524 F. Supp. 122 (N.D.
Ga. 1981).
47 See, e.g., Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984); McElhinney v. Medical
Protective Co., 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,054; Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp.,
710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th
Cir. 1981) (en banc).
48 The controversy regarding the interstate commerce requirement stems from the
Supreme Court's decision in McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232 (1980). McLain in-
volved a challenge to the business practices of local real estate agents under federal anti-
trust laws. The complaint alleged that the defendants' local real estate activities affected
interstate commerce because purchasers and sellers of real estate moved in interstate chan-
nels, and financing for these transactions came from out-of-state sources. Id. at 235-36.
The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to establish a sufficient nexus
with interstate commerce. According to the district court, the challenged brokerage activi-
ties were intrastate in nature with only incidental connections to interstate commerce. Id. at
239-40. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, taking the position that realty
and brokerage activities were purely local in nature, and the interstate financing transac-
tions were not an integral part of these local activities. Id. at 240..
The Supreme Court vacated the lower court decisions, holding that the brokers' activi-
ties which were "infected" by the illegal conduct could be shown to have a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. Id. at 246-47. Sherman Act jurisdiction requires an allegation in
the pleadings "either that the defendants' activity is itself in interstate commerce or, if it is
local in nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity demonstrably in
interstate commerce." Id. at 242.
The Court declined to require a particularized showing of the effect on interstate com-
merce arising from the challenged activity. To require such a showing would circumvent
the purpose of the interstate commerce requirement where the challenged activity failed to
produce the desired restraint. Id. at 242-43.
The language of McLain suggests that courts should broadly construe the interstate
commerce requirement. Some lower courts, however, have been reluctant to do so. See
note 54 infra. For an analysis of McLain and possible interpretations of the interstate com-
merce requirement, see Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 13, at 632-36;
Note,Jurisdiction Under the Sherman Act: A Close Look at the Affects Test, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
603 (1985).
49 Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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services,50 or that the physician receives reimbursement from out-
of-state insurers. 5' Denial of admitting privileges will affect inter-
state commerce through these channels. A non-physician provider,
however, may be ineligible for direct reimbursement from third-
party insurers, 52 or not sufficiently established to draw patients
from across state lines.
But, if the court considers the defendant's activity in interstate
commerce, the plaintiffs burden is eased. In considering the de-
fendant's conduct, the courts generally apply one of two tests: (1)
the general business activities test,5 3 or (2) the challenged conduct
test. 54 Under the "general business activites" test, the plaintiff need
only show that the hospital's overall conduct affects interstate com-
merce. Because hospitals generally purchase supplies from out-of-
state companies or receive reimbursements from out-of-state insur-
ers, 55 the plaintiff will generally have little difficulty in meeting the
interstate commerce requirement under this test.56
The plaintiff will have more difficulty if the court requires a
50 Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
51 Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976).
52 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 722.
53 The Third and Ninth Circuits have adopted a broad interpretation of McLain, hold-
ing that if the defendant's overall business activity affects interstate commerce then jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act exists. This reasoning draws on the expansive power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce under the commerce clause. Therefore, even
"local" activity falls within the reach of the Sherman Act if some aspect of the activity bur-
dens interstate commerce. See Cardio-Medical Assocs. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center,
721 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1983); cf. Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985); Hahn v. Oregon Physicians Servs., 689 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 3115 (1983).
54 The First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits interpret McLain narrowly and
require a showing that the challenged activity affects interstate commerce. See Hayden v.
Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338 (8th Cir. 1984); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 1984-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 66,054; Furlong v. Long Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1983);
Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir.
1981); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
These cases do not clearly indicate to what degree the plaintiff must show an effect on
interstate commerce. For example, in Furlong, allegations by the plaintiff that he received
third-party reimbursement for patient care from out-of-state sources, that he purchased
goods from out-of-state suppliers, and that the defendant received money from the federal
government were deemed insufficient to establish the requisite jurisdictional nexus. 710
F.2d at 924. Yet, the Second Circuit also stated that the plaintiff does not have to make an
explicit showing of a causal link between interstate commerce and the allegedly unlawful
conduct. Id. at 926.
In Intermountain Health, the Tenth Circuit adopted the "narrow" interpretation of Mc-
Lain but found that the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant served patients from a tri-
state area, that he received third-party reimbursement from out-of-state insurers, and that
the plaintiff purchased substantial amounts of supplies from out-of-state suppliers satisfied
the jurisdictional requirement. 637 F.2d at 725.
55 See Note, supra note 6, at 395.
56 See note 46 supra.
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showing that the challenged conduct itself affects interstate commerce.
Courts adopting this standard require a more particularized show-
ing of the effect on interstate commerce. Unfortunately, these
courts have not articulated clear standards-by which they judge the
sufficiency of complaints, other than stating that general allegations
regarding the hospital's overall business activities will not suffice. 57
In the spirit of McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans,58
courts should broadly construe the jurisdictional requirement
under the Sherman Act. Hospital activities affect interstate com-
merce through transactions with interstate insurers and suppliers
and the movement of patients across state lines. Access to hospital
facilities, through admitting privileges, opens channels of interstate
commerce to health care providers. Conversely, these channels
may be closed when privileges are denied. If, as the Supreme
Court has indicated, the reach of the Sherman Act corresponds to
the breadth of congressional power under the commerce clause,59
challenges to the denial of admitting privileges clearly fall within
Sherman Act jurisdiction.
C. Restraint of Trade
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that the activity in question
constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade. In challenging the
denial of hospital admitting privileges as a group boycott, 60 the
non-physician provider faces the major obstacle of characteriza-
tion.6 1 If the court finds that the conduct meets the requirements
of a "classic" group boycott, the per se rule of illegality applies. On
the other hand, if the plaintiff fails to establish that the activity falls
within the per se category, then the rule of reason applies. In this
case, the court will engage in extensive economic analyses of the
purpose and effect of the restraint to determine if it unduly re-
strains competition. Under either the per se rule or the rule of rea-
son, however, the non-physician provider should prevail whenever
57 See note 47 supra.
58 444 U.S. 232 (1980). See note 48 supra.
59 See McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 241 (1980); Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trust-
ees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976); United States v. Employing Plasterers
Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189 (1954). See also Blumstein & Sloan, Redefining Government's Role in
Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849, 912-
15 (1981).
60 When a hospital denies admitting privileges to non-physician providers, these prov-
iders cannot enter the field of hospital-based health care services. Physicians effectively
control the process whereby privileges are granted or denied. See note 30 supra and accom-
panying text. Therefore, the denial represents an attempt by physicians to prevent poten-
tial competitors from entering the marketplace. This constitututes a group boycott or
concerted refusal to deal. See also Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 752; Drexel, supra note
42, at 222; Kissam, Antitrust Boycott Doctrine, 69 IowA L. REv. 1165, 1212-13 (1984).
61 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
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the hospital has denied privileges on grounds unrelated to individ-
ual competence. 62
Denial of admitting privileges to a class of competitors closely
resembles the classic group boycott consistently condemned by the
Supreme Court as per se illegal.63 An element of group boycott
activity is an agreement between two or more parties not to deal
with a third party. This agreement may be express or implied. 64
An express agreement may take the form of hospital policies or
bylaws which prohibit granting of admitting privileges to non-phy-
sicians. When the medical staff acts pursuant to these policies, the
individual physicians, in effect, act pursuant to an agreement to
deny potential competitors access to services needed to maintain
parity in competition. 65 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has
condemned such activity as per se illegal. 66
In the absence of an express agreement, when a hospital con-
sistently denies admitting privileges to non-physicians or subjects
them to more rigorous application procedures, the court may infer
the necessary agreement from this conduct. For example, in Weiss
v. York Hospital,67 an osteopath challenged the denial of admitting
privileges to York Hospital under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Based upon the jury's findings that the hospital applied more rigor-
ous and unreasonable application procedures to osteopaths than it
did to medical doctors, the district court held that the medical staff
had engaged in a group boycott against osteopaths. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed this portion of the lower
court's ruling.68 Other evidence from which a court may infer an
agreement includes a departure from normal review procedures,
62 This note only addresses the denial of admitting privileges because of the applicant's
status as a non-physician. Legitimate denials based upon proven individual incompetence
in a particular field should not be subject to antitrust scrutiny. The latter decision involves
reasonable restrictions designed to maintain the hospital's quality of care and thus has pro-
competitive effects. In contrast, the former decision, by providing a blanket prohibition,
effectively insulates the medical staff from economic competition provided by non-physi-
cians. This anticompetitive result lies within the prohibitions of antitrust laws. Cf. Weiss v.
York Hosp. 745 F.2d 786, 820, n.60 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
63 See notes 19-27 supra and accompanying text.
64 See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
65 This situation parallels the bylaws struck down by the Supreme Court in Associated
Press. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
66 See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (bylaws giving association
members veto power over applications of competitor nonmembers struck down as facially
restrictive of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC,
312 U.S. 457 (1941) (explicit agreement between designers and manufacturers not to deal
with retailer who sold products manufactured by "style pirates" constitutes a per se illegal
group boycott).
67 745 F.2d 786 (3d. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
68 Id. at 818-19. See also Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States,
234 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1914) (conspiracy inferred based on parties' conduct); Kissan, Web-
ber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 13, at 640 (agreement suggested by history of physician
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such as ad hoc meetings regarding the applicant outside of the hos-
pital, 69 staff members' threats to resign if an applicant receives ad-
mitting privileges, 70 economic incentives for defendants to refuse
to deal with the plaintiff,7' and close contact or contractual agree-
ments among alleged conspirators. 72
Per se illegal group boycotts also involve a purpose to destroy
competition or seriously damage the competitive position of a ri-
val. 73 Blanket denials of admitting privileges to non-physicians ef-
fectuate these purposes by reducing access to necessary services
and thereby eliminating one form of competition. 74
Generally, neither the hospital nor its medical staff would ad-
mit such a blatantly anticompetitive purpose. They would probably
attempt to justify their actions based on concerns for patient safety
or ethical norms. Many courts have accepted these justifications as
a basis for applying the rule of reason, rather than the per se rule.75
These justifications, however, are inappropriate in the context of
blanket denial of admitting privileges to non-physicians.
Differential treatment of professionals under the antitrust laws
stems from Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.7 6 In Goldfarb, the Supreme
Court held that a minimum fee schedule promulgated by a local bar
association constituted price-fixing and violated section 1 of the
Sherman Act.77 The Court indicated, however, that situations in-
volving the "public service aspect or other features of the profes-
sions" may receive more lenient treatment under antitrust
domination over privilege decisions, economic interests of physicians in limiting admitting
privileges, and hospital accreditation standards).
69 See McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 130 (E.D. Ky. 1982),
remanded on other grounds, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,054.
70 Id.
71 See Trident Neuro-Imaging Laboratory v. Blue Cross, 568 F. Supp. 1474, 1478
(D.S.C. 1983).
72 Id.
73 See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
74 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 753 (purpose of hospital and medical staff boy-
cotts includes putting the competitor out of business).
75 See, e.g., Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207, 221 (7th Cir. 1983) (evidence
of a patient care motive mandates application of the rule of reason), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
2398 (1984); McElhinney v. Medical Protective Co., 549 F. Supp. 121, 133 (E.D. Ky. 1983),
(restraints based on public service or ethical norms analyzed under rule of reason), remanded
on other grounds, 1984-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,054. See also Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d.
786, 821 n.61 (3d Cir. 1984) (rule of reason analysis would apply where defendant asserts a
public welfare or ethical norm justification), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985); Veizaga v.
National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(antitrust challenges to noncommercial professional activity governed by rule of reason).
But see, Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammed, 586 F.2d 530, 546-47 (5th Cir.
1978) (industry self-regulation may be subject to per se rule if plaintiff shows at least mini-
mal indicia of anticompetitive purpose), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979).
76 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
77 Without using "per se" language, the Court condemned the fee schedule as a "clas-
sic illustration of price fixing." Id. at 783.
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analysis.78
The Court clarified this public service caveat in National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States79 by limiting the "exception"
to restraints which regulate and promote competition. 80 The opin-
ion suggests that such restraints would be analyzed under the rule
of reason rather than the per se rule.81 Therefore, the "exception"
under antitrust analysis for professional activity only applies to re-
straints which have a pro-competitive purpose. The "exception" is
not an exemption. Rather, it merely removes the case from per se
treatment.8
2
When a defendant in a privilege denial case offers a public ser-
vice justfication, courts must determine whether the denial has a
pro-competitive purpose.83 In the absence of such a purpose, the
per se rule should apply where the challenged conduct meets the
other requirements of a group boycott.
Blanket denials of admitting privileges to non-physicians do
not have a pro-competitive purpose. Although this conduct regu-
78 Id. at 788 n.17. The defendants in Goldfarb did not attempt to justify their actions
based on public service. The Court's public service caveat would seem to indicate that if
this defense had been offered, rule of reason rather than per se analysis would apply.
79 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Professional Engineers involved an antitrust challenge to the engi-
neering society's ethical canon which prohibited competitive bidding by its members. The
society claimed, as an affirmative defense, that competitive bidding would lead to inferior
work and jeopardize public safety. Id. at 684-85. The Court rejected this defense and held
that the ethical canon, on its face, violated § 1 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 693. Therefore,
the district court had correctly refused to consider evidence regarding the degree to which
competitive bidding could negatively affect public welfare. Id. at 681.
In refusing to consider the reasonableness of the defendant's claimed justifications, the
Court appears to have applied the per se rule to invalidate the ethical canon. Therefore,
even restrictive activites which allegedly protect the public welfare, remain susceptible to
per se treatment absent a showing of some procompetitive effect. See Liebenfult & Pollard,
supra note 28, at 938.
80 435 U.S. at 696. As an example, the Court cited marketing restraints related to
product safety which had neither an anticompetitive effect nor a primary purpose of hinder-
ing competition. Id. at 696 n.22.
81 See Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 13, at 644 n.239 (in Professional
Engineers, Supreme Court applied per se rule; Court refused to recognize defendant's af-
firmative defense that competition itself is unreasonable and therefore rejected rule of rea-
son analysis).
82 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) supports this inter-
pretation of the "public service" exception. In Maricopa County, the Court held that maxi-
mum-fee schedules established by local medical foundations were per se illegal under § 1 of
the Sherman Act as a form of price-fixing. The medical foundations justified their action as
a means of improving the marketability of their services. Since this restraint did not regu-
late and promote competition within the meaning of Professional Engineers, the Court applied
the per se rule. Id. at 349.
83 Where the hospital defends its conduct as a form of standard setting or self-regula-
tion, at a minimum, the activity must provide objective standards for evaluation and proce-
dural safeguards. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). See also Liebenluft &
Pollard, supra note 28, at 953.
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lates competition, it does so only by excluding potential competi-
tors from the market for hospital-based services. The Supreme
Court has long held this type of activity per se illegal.8 4
Some restraints may enhance the quality of professional serv-
ices, justifying rule of reason analysis.85 Examples include educa-
tional and licensing requirements which promote minimal
standards of competence, denial or revocation of admitting privi-
leges based on demonstrated individual incompetence, and restric-
tions on staff size based on the availability of resources and support
personnel. These restraints are pro-competitive because they stim-
ulate intraprofessional competition, thereby raising the standard of
care.
86
Blanket denials to non-physicians, on the other hand, do not
stimulate competition. First, blanket denials eliminate a potential
source of competitors for physicians, decreasing their incentive to
remain efficient. Second, non-physicians lose a market for their
services and cannot compete at all in the area of hospital-based
care. When faced with a public service justification for the denial of
staff privileges to non-physicians, courts should recognize this lack
of pro-competitive purpose and not automatically apply the rule of
reason. When other elements of a "classic" group boycott exist,
courts should condemn the restraint as per se illegal.
To determine whether an activity constitutes a group boycott,
courts examine the effect of the restraint on competition. If the
restraint primarily limits the freedom of competitors to deal in the
marketplace or denies market access to potential competitors, the
conduct resembles a per se illegal boycott.87
Denial of admitting privileges to non-physicians as a class has
three primary effects. First, the non-physicians cannot enter the
market for hospital-based services, leaving them at a distinct com-
petitive disadvantage.8 8 Not only will they lose business by having
to refer patients in need of such services to physicians with admit-
ting privileges, but also many potential patients will not seek the
services of non-physicians because they cannot provide both in-pa-
84 See, e.g., United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127 (1966); Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
85 Maricopa County suggests that justifications based upon improvement in professional
services would satisfy the pro-competitive requirement of the public service exception. 457
U.S. at 349.
86 For a discussion of the pro-competitive aspects of improved standards of care, see
Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe, supra note 13, at 611.
87 See notes 24-25 supra and accompanying text.
88 Where a restraint causes a class of competitors to lose access to a necessary service,
the Supreme Court has condemned the activity as per se illegal. See, e.g., United States v.
General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 145 (1966); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341,
348-49 (1963); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 13 (1945).
19851
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
tient and out-patient care.8 9
Second, physicians with admitting privileges cannot consult or
refer patients to non-physicians. This adversely affects health care
costs because the physician-and ultimately the patient-has no ac-
cess to the lower cost services of non-physician providers. Further-
more, both physicians and non-physicians lose a potential
reciprocal source of patient referrals. 90
For a physician with admitting privileges, the economic conse-
quences of denying privileges to non-physicians are positive. The
physician has an interest in limiting the number of practitioners in
his or her specialty area because as the demand for that type of
service increases the physician will benefit from more patients. 91
The patient, on the other hand, has an interest in an increased pool
of providers and lower costs. 92 When non-physician providers can-
not gain access to hospitals, however, patients in need of hospital
services have no choice but to resort to physicians. Because these
patients become, in effect, a "captive audience," physicians have
less incentive to keep costs down in order to remain competitive.
The third effect of restricting admitting privileges only to phy-
sicians is the concentration of economic power in the hands of a
small group of providers, another hallmark of per se illegal activ-
ity.93 Physicians become the sole source of access to hospital-based
care.
Overall, blanket denial of admitting privileges to non-physi-
cians suppresses competition between these providers and physi-
cians, and reduces consumer choice in the health care industry.
Such effects support characterization of the conduct as a group boy-
cott and condemnation under the per se rule.
The final characteristic of a classic group boycott is market
power.94 In a rural setting with few hospitals, the plaintiff easily
should establish that the defendant has the requisite market
power.95 In an urban area with many hospitals, the necessary mar-
ket power could still be established, depending on the court's defi-
nition of the appropriate market.96
89 See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
90 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 713-14; Note, supra note 6, at 388.
91 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 714-17; Kissam, Webber, Bigus & Holzgraefe,
supra note 13, at 609-10.
92 See Dolan & Ralston, sup-a note 3, at 719-21.
93 See, e.g., Kors, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1959); Fashion
Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466-67 (1941).
94 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
95 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 742.
96 The relevant market can be defined in terms of both a product and a geographic
market. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 11, § 12, at 41. In the health care industry, the product
market includes services which consumers consider a reasonable substitute for one another.
The geographic market encompasses the area in which a consumer can seek alternative
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Factors which a court should consider in determining the ap-
propriate market include whether the hospital specializes in a par-
ticular type of service or has diagnostic equipment unavailable
elsewhere, 97 the degree to which the hospital draws its patient pop-
ulation from a certain geographic location,9 8 and the degree to
which denial of privileges at one hospital reduces the opportunity
to obtain privileges elsewhere. In addition, the court should con-
sider that economic constraints and regulatory controls make it im-
possible for a non-physician provider, unable to obtain admitting
privileges in an existing institution, to remedy this situation by es-
tablishing his own institution.9 9 Because these factors vary widely
among hospitals, courts will necessarily determine the market
power issue on a case-by-case basis.
Even though denial of admitting privileges to non-physician
providers as a class has all the characteristics of a per se illegal
group boycott, courts are reluctant to apply the per se rule. 00 But
services when one source of supply becomes unavailable. See Pontius v. Children's Hosp.,
552 F. Supp. 1352, 1366-67 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842,
877-78 (W.D. Pa. 1981). Therefore, the extent to which consumers view hospital services
as interchangeable and the geographic proximity of hospitals will significantly affect the size
of the appropriate market.
97 Fortner Enters. v. United States Steel Corp. (Fortner 1), 394 U.S. 495, 505-06 & n.2
(1969) (where the defendant offers a unique product which is unavailable to competitors,
likelihood increases that market power exists).
98 See Dolan & Ralston, supra note 3, at 742. But see Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984) (where 307o of residents use the challenged hospital, suffi-
cent market power not established to justify condemnation of the hospital's conduct as a
per se illegal tying arrangement). In the context of hospital market power, the court should
exercise caution in using geographic drawing power as a criterion. Unlike many traditional
commercial enterprises, hospitals do not draw their patient populations primarily from the
immediate geographic location. Because a physician may only have admitting privileges at
a few hospitals, the patient's choice is necessarily limited. Furthermore, depending on the
nature of treatment required, the patient may be forced to enter the single hospital in the
area offering such a service. Only in emergency situations will the hospital's location be-
come the single decisive factor in patient admission.
99 See Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 13 & n.10 (market power implied where an individual
could not maintain a separate organization for gathering news worldwide comparable to
that of Associated Press).
100 See, e.g., Vuciecevic v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 572 F. Supp. 1424 (N.D. Ill. 1983)
(claim of group boycott analyzed under rule of reason); McElhinney v. Medical Protective
Co., 549 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Ky. 1982) (rule of reason, rather than per se analysis, applies to
charge of group boycott against hospital and staff members); Pontius v. Children's Hosp.,
552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (alleged group boycott by hospital and physicians ana-
lyzed under the rule of reason, not the per se rule); Nara v. American Dental Ass'n, 526 F.
Supp. 452 (W.D. Mich. 1981) (even if Sherman Act jurisdiction applied, defendants would
be exempt because activities were noncommercial and intended to benefit the public);
Veizaga v. National Bd. for Respiratory Therapy, 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,274 (N.D.
Ill. 1977) (group boycott claim against professional organization analyzed under the rule of
reason if noncommercial activity involved). But see Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786 (3d
Cir. 1984) (action by medical staff denying admitting privileges to osteopath constitutes a
group boycott and is per se illegal), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985).
A case from the Seventh Circuit, Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n, 719 F.2d 207 (7th
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even under rule of reason analysis, the non-physician provider
should prevail. A balancing of the pro- and anticompetitive effects
of denying hospital admitting privileges to non-physicians shows
that this is anticompetitive conduct.
Pro-competitive justifications arguably include improved qual-
ity of care, professional standards, and reputation. The result,
however, may be the opposite.
Without competition, physicians have less incentive to practice
efficiently. This can result in higher health care costs, less innova-
tion, and fewer choices for the consumer. Other anticompetitive
effects of blanket denials include elimination of an entire class of
competitors from the market, non-physicians' loss of business, and
concentration of economic power in the physicians' hands. These
anticompetitive effects outweigh any pro-competitive benefits that
may exist.
Finally, policy reasons favor condemnation of blanket denials
under both per se and rule of reason analysis. When a hospital,
through its medical staff, follows a policy of blanket denials, the
staff acts as a form of "extra-governmental" agency condemned by
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2398 (1984), illustrates this preference for rule of reason
analysis in cases involving health care professionals. Chiropractors charged the American
Medical Association ("AMA"), other professional medical associations, and individual phy-
sicians with conspiring to eliminate the practice of chiropractic, in violation of § I of the
Sherman Act. The alleged boycott stemmed from promulgation and enforcement of the
AMA's ethical principle prohibiting professional association with chiropractors. Id. at 213.
At the trial court, the jury found for the defendants, based upon jury instructions which
implied that "public interest" motivation constitutes an affirmative defense to per se illegal
activity. Id. at 220. The court of appeals held that although the jury instructions were
erroneous, they constituted harmless error because the per se rule did not apply at all to
the case. Id. at 221.
According to the court, a per se rule applies to boycott activity only where the purpose
of the boycott is to enforce an agreement which is illegal per se. Furthermore, the exist-
ence of a "patient care" motive removed the case from the per se category. The court then
remanded the case for a new trial under a "modified" rule of reason. Id.
The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's "public service" exception, see
notes 77-82 supra and accompanying text, as authority for allowing the defendants to justify
their actions based on concern for the quality of care provided by chiropractors. 719 F.2d
at 226. The Supreme Court, however, has not "modified" the rule of reason, even for cases
involving professionals. The Court has consistently held that under either per se treatment
or the rule of reason, the inquiry focuses on the effect on competition. Noneconomic con-
siderations are irrelevant. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents,
104 S. Ct. 2948, 2962 n.26 (1984); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
The Seventh Circuit also failed to recognize that the Supreme Court developed the
"public service" exception within the contours of intraprofessional regulation. The Court
did not provide sweeping authority for one group of professionals to regulate the scope of
practice of their competitors. See Kissam, supra note 60, at 1214-16 (criticizing the Wilk
decision as contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in Professional Engineers).
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the Supreme Court in other contexts. 10' In essence, one group of
professionals takes responsibility for determining the validity of the
practices of an independent group of professionals. Neither the
boycotting professionals nor the courts should make this decision.
State licensing and practice acts regulate the scope of profes-
sional activity, and any changes in scope fall within the realm of
legislative authority. 102 Arguments for or against such changes
must be addressed to that body.
IV. Conclusion
Non-physician providers need access to hospital services
before they can be truly competitive in the health care industry.
Where access is blocked by blanket denials of admitting privileges,
section 1 of the Sherman Act may provide relief. Such denials have
the characteristics of a "classic" group boycott and as such the
courts should condemn the activity as per se illegal. Even if the
court declines to apply the per se rule, blanket denials still fail
under the rule of reason because the anticompetitive effects out-
weigh pro-competitive benefits.
Properly applied, antitrust law can open the door to true com-
petition in health care. The gains to society from such competiton
101 See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941); cf. Associated Press
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19 (1945).
102 Hospitals are generally subject to state regulation and licensing requirements, and
may claim immunity from antitrust laws under the state action doctrine. See, e.g., Maresse v.
Interqual, 748 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1984) (hospital's medical peer review activity exempt
from Sherman Act under the doctrine of state action). The Supreme Court articulated this
exemption in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), where a raisin producer-packer chal-
lenged a state program, which reduced competition among growers, as a violation of fed-
eral antitrust laws. The Court held that the Sherman Act did not apply where the state "as
sovereign, imposed the restraint as an act of government." Id. at 352; cf. Bates v. State Bar,
433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Parker immunity applies where a state supreme court acts in a legisla-
tive rather than judicial capacity).
Where a nongovernment entity acts pursuant to a legislative mandate, Parker immunity
may apply if: (1) the state policy clearly expresses a preference for regulation over competi-
tion, and (2) the state actively supervises the conduct. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 104 S. Ct.
1989, 1995 (1984); California Retail Liquor Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980). See also Blumstein & Sloan, supra note 59, at 918-20.
A state may delegate authority to hospitals to develop and implement standards for
granting admitting privileges in order to improve the quality of patient care. Although this
policy expresses a preference for some regulation, it does not sanction total exclusion of
non-physicians from the market. In this context, the hospital has available the less restric-
tive alternative of objectively evaluating non-physician applicants on an individual basis to
determine individual competence in a particular field. Courts should be wary of allowing
the state action defense to develop into a "cover up" for anticompetitive conduct intended
to eliminate a class of competitors from the health care field.
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include lower costs and the increased availability of services-
proper goals of the antitrust laws.
Sharon A. Christie
